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WHEN PRISONERS ARE WEARY AND THEIR
RELIGIOUS EXERCISE BURDENED, RLUIPA PROVIDES
SOME REST FOR THEIR SOULS'
Anne Y. Chiu
Abstract: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)
prohibits state and local governments from substantially burdening a prisoner's exercise of
religion unless the government can show that its action is the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling governmental interest. Prior to RLUIPA, courts subjected prisoners'
claims of violations of their right to exercise their religion to a "rational-relationship"
standard. Because RLUIPA ("the Act") places a "strict scrutiny" standard on government
actions burdening prisoners' religious exercise, the Act is a legislative accommodation of
religion. Under Lemon v. Kurtzman, legislative accommodations violate the Establishment
Clause if their primary effect is to advance religion. When applying the Lemon test, the U.S.
Supreme Court has considered three factors particularly relevant in determining whether a
legislative accommodation advances religion: the severity of the burden on religion that the
accommodation seeks to relieve, the burden the accommodation imposes on third parties, and
the scope of the accommodation. This Comment argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should
hold that RLUIPA is constitutional because it lifts substantial burdens on religious exercise,
does not burden third parties, and has a broad enough scope in light of its secular legislative
purpose.
In the prison system, the government closely regulates the right of
prisoners to exercise their religion.2 In order to exercise this right,
prisoners must usually request a "departure from otherwise applicable
policies."' 3  The government cannot completely deny a prisoner's
constitutional right to exercise religion,4 and it cannot impinge upon a
prisoner's right to religious exercise without a rational penological
justification.5 Yet some prisons "restrict religious liberty in egregious
and unnecessary ways" and impose substantial burdens on prisoners in
practicing their religious faiths.6
1. See Matthew 11:28-29 (New International Version).
2. See Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1891-92 (2002)
[hereinafter The Law of Prisons].
3. Id. at 1892.
4. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 595 (1979)).
5. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
6. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy).
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The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 20007
(RLUIPA) subjects prisoners' claims of substantial government-imposed
burdens on religious exercise to a "strict scrutiny" standard.8 RLUIPA
was enacted to protect the religious liberty of institutionalized persons. 9
Previously, burdens imposed on prisoners' constitutional rights were
subject to the "rational-relationship" test from Turner v. Safley.'0 In
Turner, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the rational-relationship
test was sufficient to ensure prisoners' rights under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment." In contrast to the deferential Turner
standard, RLUIPA prohibits government officials from imposing
substantial burdens on the religious exercise of institutionalized persons
unless the burdens are the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling government interest.'
2
Because RLUIPA provides persons with greater protection for
religious exercise while in prison, it is a legislative accommodation of
religion.' 3 A "legislative accommodation" of religion lifts a neutral,'
4
generally applicable burden on religion imposed by the government. 15
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2000).
8. Id. § 2000cc-l(a); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 264-65 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting RLUIPA
requires courts to apply "strict scrutiny" to substantial burdens on religious exercise).
9. S. 2869, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted). While RLUIPA also protects against land use
regulations that impose a substantial burden on religious exercise, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, this
Comment discusses only the institutionalized persons provisions, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
10. 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
11. Id. at 89. The Free Exercise Clause states that "Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion] . U..." S. CONST. amend. I.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
13. See id.; O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
14. "Neutral" means that the statute on its face is not specifically directed at religious practice.
See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 497 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990) (distinguishing statutes that
explicitly discriminate against or target religious practices as the object of the law from those that
incidentally burden religion but are otherwise valid laws).
15. This Comment employs the term "legislative accommodation" narrowly to refer to the lifting
or removal of neutral government-imposed burdens on religion, religious organizations, or
individuals. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (exempting
religious organizations from federal prohibition against religious discrimination in employment
practices). Sometimes the courts label this an "exemption," although this is not the same as the term
of art "tax exemption." See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (citing a legislative accommodation as a
"nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption"). While "legislative accommodation" may also
mean any legislative attempt to meet the religious needs of an organization or individual regardless
of whether a state-imposed burden exists, see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706
(1994) (legislative attempt to accommodate for the educational needs of the handicapped children in
a Jewish sect), this broader definition is not used here. Therefore, although in certain cases the
courts may use the term accommodation to have the broader meaning, this Comment focuses on the
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Legislators enact some legislative accommodations in order to bring a
government actor or program into compliance with the Free Exercise
Clause, 16 while other accommodations go beyond what the U.S.
Constitution requires in order to meet the special needs of religion.
17
Since RLUIPA's enactment, the federal circuits have split over
whether the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.1 8 The circuit split turns on whether
RLUIPA's primary effect is to advance religion 9 in violation of Lemon
v. Kurtzman.20 U.S. Supreme Court decisions utilizing the Lemon test
21
employ three factors to determine whether the primary effect of a
legislative accommodation is to advance religion.22 These factors are: (1)
the severity of the burden on religion the accommodation seeks to
relieve; (2) the burden the accommodation imposes on third parties; and
(3) the scope of the accommodation.23 The United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that the
24primary effect of RLUIPA does not advance religion. In contrast, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that
RLUIPA's primary effect is to advance religion.25
narrower kind of accommodation.
16. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that the state's denial of
unemployment benefits to a worker due to religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause).
17. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 336 (finding that the statutory exemption from Title VII's
prohibition against religious discrimination in employment, though not required by the Free
Exercise Clause, allowed religious organizations to carry out their religious missions freely).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... "). While RLUIPA has been challenged on other constitutional grounds, this Comment
focuses on the Establishment Clause challenge.
19. Compare Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that RLUIPA's
primary effect does not advance religion), and Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 611 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that RLUIPA's primary effect does not advance religion), and Mayweathers v.
Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that RLUIPA's primary effect does not
advance religion), with Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
RLUIPA's primary effect advances religion).
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21. These include both pre-Lemon and post-Lemon cases. See infra note 74.
22. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1981); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
23. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11-17 (plurality opinion); Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15, 338;
Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709; Gillette, 401 U.S. at 445, 452-53; Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73.
24. Madison, 355 F.3d at 318; Charles, 348 F.3d at 611; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1068.
25. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267 (6th Cir. 2003). While the Sixth Circuit concluded
that RLUIPA likely did not have a secular purpose, it determined that this finding was not necessary
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This Comment argues that RLUIPA's primary effect is not to advance
religion. Part I discusses the historical context and legal landscape that
prompted the enactment of RLUIPA and the protection RLUIPA
provides for religious exercise in prisons. Part II discusses the U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine on legislative accommodation in Establishment
Clause challenges, with particular focus on the three relevant factors
from this legislative accommodation precedent. Part III details the circuit
split regarding RLUIPA's constitutionality under the Establishment
Clause. Finally, Part IV argues that RLUIPA is a permissible legislative
accommodation because it lifts substantial burdens on prisoners'
religious exercise, does not impermissibly burden third parties, and has
an appropriate scope in light of its secular legislative purpose.
I. CONGRESS RESPONDED TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S
DILUTION OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE BY
ENACTING RLUIPA
Over the past forty years, the U.S. Supreme Court's Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence has undergone a dramatic shift, which led
Congress to enact RLUIPA in 2000.26 In 1963, the Court determined in
Sherbert v. Verner 27 that courts should apply a strict scrutiny standard to
neutral government-imposed burdens on religious exercise.28 In 1990,
the Court in Employment Division v. Smith29 retreated from this position
and reinterpreted Sherbert and its other precedent to hold that the Free
Exercise Clause did not require such an exacting standard.30 The Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause provided little, if any, constitutional
protection for religious exercise from neutral government-imposed
burdens.31 In response to this ruling, Congress repeatedly attempted to
restore the protection for religious exercise that the Court had recognized
for its decision. Id. at 264. It also doubted whether RLUIPA resulted in excessive entanglement
between church and state, but did not reach this issue because it concluded that RLUIPA had an
impermissible effect. Id. at 267-68. This Comment focuses only on the conflict regarding the
"primary effect" prong, and assumes that the purpose and entanglement prongs are not at issue.
26. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.3.2.2-12.3.2.4 (2d ed. 2002)
(describing Establishment Clause jurisprudence since 1960).
27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
28. Id. at 403.
29. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
30. Id. at 878-79.
31. Id.
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in Sherbert.32 RLUIPA is Congress's most recent attempt, applying the
Sherbert strict scrutiny standard to the religious exercise of prisoners.33
Prior to RLUIPA, Turner's deferential rational-relationship test
governed the review of religious exercise violations in prisons.34
RLUIPA makes it more difficult for prisons to impose neutral, generally
applicable burdens on religious exercise and therefore constitutes a
legislative accommodation of religion.35
A. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment Protects
Religious Exercise
In 1963, the Sherbert Court first articulated a robust interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause that exemplified the high value the Court
placed on prohibiting government interference with an individual's
religious exercise.36 The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
necessitated a strict scrutiny review of neutral, generally applicable laws
that impose burdens on religious exercise. 37 This standard required the
government to prove a compelling government interest to justify the
burden.38 The Court consistently upheld this interpretation in the decades
following Sherbert.39
However, in 1990, the Smith Court broke from the Sherbert rule by
reinterpreting the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause to provide
little, if any, constitutional protection for religious exercise burdened by
32. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2000); Religious
Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999); Religious Liberty Protection Act of
1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998).
33. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000) ("No government shall impose a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of a person ... unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person is in furtherance of a compelling government interest... "), with Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 403 (concluding that a "compelling state interest" may justify an incidental burden on
religion).
34. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2003).
35. See id. at 265.
36. Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 894-96 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (explaining U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence that requires compelling
governmental interests to justify encroachments on religious liberty); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972) (noting that "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served" can justify infringements on free exercise of religion).
37. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
38. Id. at 403.
39. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 & n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court had been
"consistent and exacting" in developing the Sherbert standard and citing the cases that had applied
it); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, § 12.3.2.2.
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neutral, generally applicable laws.40 Thus, today the Free Exercise
Clause does not require the government to demonstrate a compelling
government interest to justify those burdens. 41 Furthermore, the Free
Exercise Clause does not require legislatures to accommodate religion
by exempting religious individuals from those burdens.42 Instead, the
Smith Court affirmed the power and the discretion of legislatures to
enact statutory protection beyond what the Free Exercise Clause
required.43 That is, the Court indicated that although the Free Exercise
Clause did not require it, legislatures could enact accommodations to
protect religion beyond the Free Exercise Clause minimum without
"establishing" religion and thereby running afoul of the Establishment
Clause.44
B. Congress's Legislative Response: RFRA and RL UIPA
In response to Smith, Congress enacted several pieces of legislation,
including RLUIPA, to restore the Sherbert protection for religious
exercise. 45 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)46
explicitly adopted the Sherbert strict scrutiny standard to protect
religious exercise in all spheres. 47 However, in 1997, the Court in City of
Boerne v. Flores48 held RFRA unconstitutional, as applied to the states,
because Congress exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment
in enacting RFRA. 49 The Boerne Court did not rule on the issue of the
40. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-85. The Court noted some possible exceptions to this rule. One
includes hybrid rights where free exercise involves other constitutional protections like freedom of
speech; another includes contexts where there has been "individualized governmental assessment"
of the reasons for the relevant conduct. Id. at 881, 884.
41. See id. at 888-89.
42. Id. at 878-80.
43. Id. at 890.
44. See id. The Court in Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004), also affirmed that there is
legislative discretion to protect religious exercise at a greater level than required by the Free
Exercise Clause, but within the level permitted by the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1311.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
bb-4 (2000); Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999); Religious
Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4.
47. Id. § 2000bb-I.
48. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
49. Id. at 536. Although the Court's language in Boerne is ambiguous, RFRA appears to be valid
as applied to federal laws and practices. See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 400-
01 (7th Cir. 2003) (determining that "RFRA may be applied to the internal operations of the
national government"); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that RFRA
1004
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constitutionality of the strict scrutiny standard under the Establishment
Clause.50
In response to Boerne,5 Congress enacted RLUIPA ("the Act"). The
Act, which applies to regulations involving land use and institutionalized
persons, requires the Sherbert strict scrutiny of government actions in
religious exercise claims. 2 Because Congress passed RLUIPA using its
powers under the Spending and Commerce Clause powers,53 the Act
applies only to state and local prisons and prison officials that receive
federal funds, as well as to their regulations that substantially burden
religious exercise and affect interstate commerce.54
C. RLUIPA Limits the Burdens that States Can Impose on Prisoners'
Exercise of Religion
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that religious exercise rights
in prisons are more circumscribed than religious exercise rights outside
prison walls. 5 In 1987, when the Sherbert strict scrutiny standard still
applied to religious exercise claims outside prisons, the Court in Turner
established that courts should apply the rational-relationship test when
determining whether a state action impermissibly infringes on a
prisoner's fundamental rights.56 Under this test, prison regulations
burdening prisoners' constitutional rights are valid as long as they bear a
rational-relationship to penological interests.5 7 The rational-relationship
"is constitutional as applied in the federal realm"); Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072, 1073
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the portion of RFRA applicable to the federal government "survived
the Supreme Court's decision striking down the statute as applied to the States"); Kikumura v.
Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that Boerne "does not determine the
constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal government"); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical
Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that RFRA is
constitutional when applied to federal law).
50. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512, 536.
51. In 1998 and 1999, Congress considered but did not enact the Religious Liberty Protection Act
(RLPA) that set forth the same RFRA standard, but based its authority to enact the law on its
powers in the Spending and Commerce Clauses. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R.
1691, 106th Cong. (1999); Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong.
(1998).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-i (2000).
53. Id. § 2 90cc-1(b).
54. Id.
55. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
56. The Law of Prisons, supra note 2, at 1893.
57. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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test extends considerable deference to prison officials. 58
In O 'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,59 the Court affirmed that this rational-
relationship test applies to prisoners' religious rights.60 Although the
O'Lone Court held that the Free Exercise Clause only requires courts to
apply a rational-relationship standard when reviewing violations of the
religious exercise rights of prisoners, 6' RLUIPA raised the standard to
strict scrutiny.62 Under RLUIPA, state and local governments may not
substantially burden the religious exercise of institutionalized persons
unless the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling government interest.
63
In order to avoid or relieve burdens on religious exercise, the
government may choose to enact a "legislative accommodation," a
statute enacted by the legislature to lift a neutral, generally applicable
64burden on religion imposed by the government. RLUIPA requires that
regulations imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious
exercise rights satisfy a strict-scrutiny standard.65 Without the Act,
government-imposed burdens on these rights would be subject to the
rational-relationship review.66 By holding prisons officials to this higher
standard, RLUIPA makes it more difficult for prison officials to impose
the burden on religion and therefore constitutes a legislative
accommodation of religion.67
II. LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATIONS AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The U.S. Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
permits legislative actions to accommodate religion beyond the level
58. The Law of Prisons, supra note 2, at 1893.
59. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
60. Id. at 349.
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
63. Id.
64. This Comment employs the term "legislative accommodation" narrowly to refer to the lifting
or removal of neutral government-imposed burdens on religion, religious organizations, or
individuals.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a). RLUIPA has the same strict-scrutiny standard as RFRA. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000).
66. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 263 (6th Cir. 2003).
67. Id. at 263-64.
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68
required by the Free Exercise Clause. However, the Court has
determined that some legislative accommodations advance religion and
therefore violate the Establishment Clause. 69 To determine whether a
legislative accommodation violates the Establishment Clause, courts
apply the three-prong test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.70  Under the Lemon test, a legislative
accommodation does not violate the Establishment Clause if it passes a
three-pronged analysis: (1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) its
primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it does
not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.7' The
second prong of the test is at issue in decisions construing RLUIPA.72
This prong concerns whether RLUIPA's primary effect is to advance
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.7 3 When considering
the constitutionality of legislative accommodations under the Lemon
test,74 the U.S. Supreme Court has considered three factors: (1) the
severity of the government-imposed burden on religion that the
accommodation seeks to relieve,75  (2) the burden that the
68. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990).
69. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding
that a sales tax exemption for exclusively religious periodicals and books violates the Establishment
Clause); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (holding that a Sabbath
statute violates the Establishment Clause).
70. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See, e.g., Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2003)
(stating that the Lemon test is the appropriate method to determine whether RLUIPA is
constitutional); Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262-63 (6th Cir. 2003) (electing to use the "traditional three-part
Lemon analysis" to evaluate RLUIPA's constitutionality); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 610
(7th Cir. 2003) (noting that the Lemon test is the appropriate method to determine whether Congress
violated the Establishment Clause); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that the Lemon test determines whether an accommodation statute is neutral).
71. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
72. Madison, 355 F.3d at 318; Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267; Charles, 348 F.3d at 611; Mayweathers,
314 F.3d at 1068.
73. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
74. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on some legislative accommodations prior to Lemon,
it paid close attention to the primary effect of advancing religion prior to setting down the formal
test in Lemon. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1981) (noting that the
Establishment Clause requires a secular purpose, evenhandedness in operation, and a neutral
primary impact, and prohibits undue government involvement in religious affairs); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668, 674 (1970) (considering whether statute's purpose was to advance or
inhibit religion and whether there was excessive government entanglement with religion).
75. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding
permissible "legislative exemptions ... that were designed to relieve government intrusions that
might significantly deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct protected by the Free Exercise
1007
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accommodation places on third parties,76 and (3) the scope of the
accommodation.77
A. Legislative Accommodations Must Lift a Significant Burden on the
Exercise of Religion
Under the Establishment Clause, Congress may accommodate
significant burdens or "serious encroachments on protected religious
freedoms" that result from the implementation of neutral laws of general
applicability,78 even when the burdens do not "prohibit" the free exercise
of religion and violate the minimum protection required by the Free
Exercise Clause. 79 A statute or regulation imposes a significant burden
on individuals when it forces them to choose between acting in a manner
offensive to their beliefs or suffering penalties. 80 For example, in Gillette
v. United States,8' the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a federal
Clause"); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (finding it proper for a
government regulation to lift burdens on religious exercise); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 445 (noting that
the legislative accommodation was intended to prevent placing a burden on religious conscientious
objectors to choose between religious conscience and suffering penalties).
76. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion) (finding legislative accommodation
that did not substantially burden third parties to be permissible); Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15
(distinguishing the accommodation from another legislative accommodation that impermissibly
burdened third parties); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (finding the
legislative accommodation failed to consider the interests and convenience of third parties).
77. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11-17 (plurality opinion) (finding legislative
accommodations permissible only, with a few exceptions, when they also benefit nonreligious
groups, and determining that the breadth of nonreligious groups that must be included in the
accommodation depends on the accommodation's purpose); Amos, 483 U.S. at 338 (finding
legislative accommodations that exclusively benefit religious entities are not per se invalid and are
permissible when lifting burdens on religion); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 452-53 (noting that the
legislative accommodation's purpose was not designed to favor any sect or religion); Walz, 397 U.S.
at 672-73 (noting that the legislative accommodation did not single out particular religious entities
or religion in general, where the purpose was to foster society's mental or moral improvement).
78. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion). While the secular purpose prong of
Lemon addresses whether an accommodation's purpose is to lift a burden on religion, the primary
effect prong considers whether the accommodation does in fact lift such a burden. See Lemon, 403
U.S. at 612-13.
79. See, e.g., Gillette, 401 U.S. at 461 n.23 (noting that the Court has suggested that permissible
relief for religious conscientious objectors is not mandated by the U.S. Constitution).
80. Id. at 445, 453.
81. 401 U.S. 437 (1981). Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Gillette before Lemon, the
Court had already paid close attention to the primary effect of advancing religion prior to setting
down the formal test in Lemon. See id. at 450; see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 668, 674 (considering
whether statute's purpose was to advance or inhibit religion and whether there was excessive
government entanglement with religion).
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conscientious objector statute that exempts from military service anyone
who opposes all war by reason of "religious training and belief.,82 The
Court noted that while the Free Exercise Clause did not require the
exemption of conscientious objectors from compulsory military
83service, opposition to war is an issue of conscience and "duty to a
moral power higher than the State. 8 4 The Court concluded that forcing
people opposed to war on religious grounds to choose between
"contravening imperatives of religion and conscience or suffering
penalties" would significantly burden these religious individuals.85 Thus,
the Court found that it was permissible for Congress to attempt to
accommodate "free exercise values," to avoid "unnecessary clashes with
the dictates of conscience. 86
A neutral, generally applicable law imposes a significant burden when
it may inhibit the missions of religious entities due to their fear of
liability. 87 In Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 88 the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) as
constitutional under the Establishment Clause.89 Title VII of the CRA
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of religion,90 but
§ 702 exempts religious organizations from this rule.91 While the Court
assumed that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the
accommodation,92 it reasoned that without the § 702 exemption,
religious organizations' fear of liability for employment discrimination
under Title VII would inhibit the way the religious organizations carry
out their missions.93 The Court concluded that this fear was a
82. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450-51.
83. Id. at 461 n.23.
84. Id. at 453.
85. See id. at 445, 453 (noting congressional "deep concern" for imposing a choice between
suffering penalties for following one's religious conscience and following a law that "clashes" with
one's religious conscience). Although the issue in Gillette centered on the distinction between those
who opposed particular wars from those who opposed all war, both based on religious grounds, id.
at 447, the Court's rationale highlights the kind of burden on religious conscience that the Court
would deem warrants a legislative accommodation. See id. at 445,453.
86. Id. at 453.
87. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987).
88. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
89. Id. at 330.
90. Id. at 329.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 336.
93. Id. Without § 702, the organizations would still be permitted to use religious criteria to hire
1009
Washington Law Review Vol. 79:999, 2004
"significant burden" that Congress could accommodate.94
Unlike the burdens of offending religious conscience and inhibiting
religious activity, the U.S. Supreme Court determined the payment of a
sales tax is not a burden severe enough to justify a legislative
accommodation. 95 In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,96 a plurality of the
Court concluded that a state sales tax on periodicals was not a sufficient
burden to justify exempting exclusively religious periodicals from the
tax.97 The plurality noted that the tax break was not a proper legislative
accommodation because the Free Exercise Clause did not require it and
it could not reasonably be seen as removing a state-imposed "deterrent
to the free exercise of religion., 98 It found that the Texas tax exemption
did not remove a "demonstrated and possibly grave imposition on
religious activity," 99 and that-tax payment would neither offend religious
beliefs nor inhibit religious activity.' 00
B. Legislative Accommodations Must Not Substantially Burden Third
Parties
A legislative accommodation may not substantially burden third
parties to a point of "unyielding weighting" in favor of the interests of
the ones accommodated. 10 1 For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court in
for religious jobs or activities, but not for non-religious ones. See id. Therefore, a court would need
to make this determination and the organization would fear liability due to a court's lack of
understanding of its religious tenets and sense of mission. Id.
94. Id. at 335-36.
95. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion).
96. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
97. Id. at 15, 18 n.8 (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 15 (plurality opinion). While the plurality opinion is not binding precedent, it should be
noted that the Texas Monthly decision preceded Smith, which dramatically changed Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence. See supra Part I.A. Therefore, the Texas Monthly plurality most likely applied
a pre-Smith understanding of the Free Exercise Clause requirements.
99. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion). While the Texas Monthly plurality
characterized the Amos accommodation as a requirement of the Free Exercise Clause, the Amos
Court assumed that it was not. Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.
100. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 (plurality opinion). Although the plurality entertained the
possibility that some religious groups might contend that tax payment violates their religious tenets,
an overriding governmental interest would likely justify the tax burden on religion, Id. at 19-20
(plurality opinion).
101. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985); see also Texas Monthly,
489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion) (noting permissible accommodations did not impose
substantial burdens on nonbeneficiaries); Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15 (noting that the legislative
accommodation impinged on third parties, but distinguishing this burden from the one held
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Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 102 held that a statute violates the
Establishment Clause when it imposes, without exception, an "absolute
duty" on a non-beneficiary of the legislative accommodation.'0 3 In
Caldor, the Connecticut legislature revised its Sunday-closing law to
permit certain classes of businesses to remain open on Sundays.10 4 The
legislature also enacted a "Sabbath statute" prohibiting people from
working more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteeing
employees the right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. 105
The Sabbath statute forced employers to conform their business
practices to the particular religious practices of their Sabbath-observing
employees. 0 6 The Court held that the Sabbath statute did not take any
account of the significant burdens imposed on others, and this
"unyielding weighting" of the Sabbath-observing employees' interests
over all other interests, including those of the employers and the non-
Sabbath observing employees, advanced religion.
0 7
The Court in Amos reaffirmed Caldor.'0 8 However, in Amos, the
Court held that § 702 of Title VII did not impermissibly burden third
parties. 10 9 While a religious organization might burden an employee by
exercising its right under § 702, discriminating against the employee on
the basis of religion would be permissible. 10 The Court distinguished
the burden under § 702 from the burden at issue in Caldor on the
grounds that the religious organization, not the state, imposed the § 702
burden. "'
C. Legislative Accommodations Must Cover an Appropriate Scope
Legislative accommodations benefiting a wide variety of groups, both
religious and secular, are more likely to withstand an Establishment
Clause attack than accommodations benefiting only religious entities or
impermissible in Caldor).
102. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
103. Id. at 708-09.
104. Id. at 705 n.2.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 709.
107. Id. at 710.
108. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 n.15 (1987).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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individuals.1 12 In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York,113 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a state property tax exemption that benefited
religious organizations,"14 as well as charitable and non-profit entities. 115
The Court reasoned that the exemption was valid, even though it
benefited religious organizations, because it did not single out a
particular church, religious group, or even churches as a whole."
16
Rather, the exemption recognized that entities fostering the community's
"moral or mental improvement"'"17 should not be inhibited in their
activities by the chance that they would lose their properties for failure
to pay property taxes." 8
In contrast to the broad tax exemption at issue in Walz, the tax
exemption in Texas Monthly applied exclusively to religious periodicals
and books. 19 The Texas Monthly Court held that the exemption violated
the Establishment Clause. 120 Although the majority determined that the
tax exemption was an impermissible statutory preference for the
dissemination of religious ideas,12' it did not agree on a rationale. 22 A
plurality of the Court took the most restrictive view of legislative
112. Compare Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) (noting that the exemption
was provided to "all houses of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by
nonprofit, quasi-public corporations" that fostered the "moral or mental improvement" of the
community), with Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding
that exemption "confined exclusively to publications advancing the tenets of a religious faith" ran
afoul of the Establishment Clause).
113. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
114. Id. at 680.
115. Id. at 673.
116. Id.
117. ld. at 672.
118. Id.
119. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Under the "narrowest grounds" doctrine in Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by the justices who concur in the judgments on the narrowest grounds. Id. (citing Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). The plurality in Texas Monthly, consisting of Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, took the most restrictive view of permissible legislative
accommodations. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 10-12 (plurality opinion). The concurring
opinion, written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justice O'Connor, did not adopt the strict view
of the plurality, but found that the statutory preference for religious ideas was impermissible under
the Establishment Clause. See id. at 26-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Because the plurality would
concur with that view, id. at 15, this would be the "narrowest grounds" and thus the holding in
Texas Monthly.
122. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
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accommodations and found that an accommodation would be
permissible only when its scope encompassed a broad class of both
religious and non-religious entities. 123 To withstand a challenge under
the Establishment Clause, how broad the class required for inclusion in
the exemption must be depends on the secular purpose of the
exemption. 124 An under-inclusion of groups benefiting from the
accommodation would constitute a government endorsement offensive
to the Establishment Clause.1 25 The plurality determined that every tax
exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers,
forcing them to become indirect donors, 26 and the Texas sales tax
exemption lacked a secular objective that would justify this preferential
benefit. 
127
Nevertheless, the plurality acknowledged two exceptions where
legislative accommodations for exclusively religious entities are
permissible. 128 First, the accommodation would be permissible when it
would not impose substantial burdens on non-beneficiaries while
allowing others to act according to their beliefs.129 Second, it would be
permissible when the Free Exercise Clause required the
accommodation.1
30
Although the Texas Monthly tax exemption lacked sufficient breadth
to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause,13 1 the Court has on
other occasions upheld legislation benefiting religious entities
exclusively on the grounds that the legislation has valid, secular
purposes. 32 For example, the Gillette Court upheld the conscientious
123. Id. at 11 (plurality opinion).
124. Id. at 15-16 (plurality opinion).
125. See id. at 16 (plurality opinion).
126. Id. at 14 (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 17 (plurality opinion). However, even if the sales tax violated a religious group's
religious tenets, the Texas Monthly plurality was still hesitant to permit the accommodation when
the Free Exercise Clause would not require it. Id. at 19 (plurality opinion). Regardless, the Smith
Court later confirmed that there is an area of legislative discretion between what the Free Exercise
Clause requires and what the Establishment Clause forbids. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 890 (1990). The Court also recently affirmed this in Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307,
1311 (2004).
128. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 14 (plurality opinion).
132. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (holding that
alleviating governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry
out their mission is a valid secular purpose); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971)
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objector exemption, noting one of its valid secular purposes included an
attempt to accommodate free exercise values and avoid conflicts with an
individual's religious conscience.' 33 Also, the Amos Court upheld § 702
of the CRA, even though it only benefits religious entities, because
§ 702 prevents a government regulation from burdening the exercise of
religion. 134 The Court noted that it had never indicated that statutes
giving special consideration to religious groups were per se invalid, and
when the government acted with the proper purpose of lifting a
government regulation that burdened the exercise of religion, there was
no need for a corresponding secular benefit.
135
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court's legislative accommodation
precedent reveals three factors that determine whether an
accommodation advances religion: the severity of the government-
imposed burden on religion that the accommodation seeks to relieve,'
36
the burden that the accommodation places on third parties, 137 and the
scope of the accommodation. 138 The severity of the government-imposed
burden that the accommodation seeks to relieve must be significant,'
39
the accommodation must not substantially burden third parties, 40 and
(holding that accommodating free exercise values is a permissible purpose).
133. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 453.
134. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36.
135. Id.
136. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion); Amos, 483 U.S. at 338; Gillette, 401
U.S. at 445.
137. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion); Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15; Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985).
138. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11-17 (plurality opinion) (finding legislative
accommodations permissible only, with a few exceptions, when they also benefit nonreligious
groups, and requiring the accommodation's purpose to determine the breadth of nonreligious groups
that must be included); Amos, 483 U.S. at 338 (noting that when government acted with proper
purpose of lifting burden on religious exercise, the action did not need to include secular entities);
Gillette, 401 U.S. at 452-53 (noting the government's valid purpose for limiting the scope of the
accommodation based on pragmatic reasons as well as respect for the principle of supremacy of
conscience); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) (finding valid legislative purpose
to limit accommodation to entities that foster "moral or mental improvement" of the community).
139. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion) (finding "legislative
exemptions ... that were designed to relieve government intrusions that might significantly deter
adherents of a particular faith from conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause" permissible);
Amos, 483 U.S. at 338 (finding it proper for a government regulation to lift burdens on religious
exercise); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 445 (noting that the legislative accommodation was intended to
prevent placing a burden on religious conscientious objectors to choose between religious
conscience and suffering penalties).
140. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion) (finding legislative
accommodation that did not substantially burden third parties to be permissible); Amos, 483 U.S. at
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the scope of the accommodation should be as broad as the secular
purpose would require.
14
'
II1. CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE ABOUT WHETHER RLUIPA
VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The U.S. Courts of Appeals that have considered RLUIPA's
constitutionality disagree about whether the primary effect of the Act is
to advance religion. 42 The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have
held that the primary effect of the Act is not to advance religion, 43 while
the Sixth Circuit has held that it is. 144 In applying the Lemon analysis to
determine RLUIPA's primary effect, the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits found that the Act lifts a burden on religious exercise. 14' The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the limitation of RLUIPA's benefits to
religious rights does not render the Act unconstitutional. 46 Conversely,
the Sixth Circuit held that the Act's primary effect is to advance religion
because it does not relieve a burden on religious exercise, 147 it burdens
third parties, 48 and it is impermissibly limited in scope to religious
entities only.'
49
337 n. 15 (noting another legislative accommodation that burdened third parties); Caldor, 472 U.S.
at 709 (finding the legislative accommodation failed to consider the interests and convenience of
third parties).
141. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11-17 (plurality opinion) (finding legislative
accommodations permissible only, with a few exceptions, when they also benefit nonreligious
groups, and determining that the breadth of nonreligious groups that must be included in the
accommodation depends on the accommodation's purpose); Amos, 483 U.S. at 338 (finding
legislative accommodations that exclusively benefit religious entities are not per se invalid and are
permissible when lifting burdens on religion); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 452-53 (noting that the
legislative accommodation's purpose was not designed to favor any sect or religion); Walz, 397 U.S.
at 672-73 (noting that the legislative accommodation did not single out particular religious entities
or religion in general, where the purpose was to foster society's mental or moral improvement).
142. Compare Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003), and Charles v. Verhagen, 348
F.3d 601, 611 (7th Cir. 2003), and Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002),
with Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267 (6th Cir. 2003).
143. Madison, 355 F.3d at 312; Charles, 348 F.3d at 611; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069.
144. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267.
145. See Madison, 355 F.3d at 318; Charles, 348 F.3d at 611; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069.
146. See Madison, 355 F.3d at 318.
147. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267.
148. See id. at 266-67.
149. See id. at 264-66.
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A. Several Circuit Courts Have Held that RLUIPA's Primary Effect Is
Not To Advance Religion
In Madison v. Riter,'50 Charles v. Verhagen,15 1 and Mayweathers v.
Newland,152 the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, respectively, held
that RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause because its
primary effect is not to advance religion.153 In upholding RLUIPA, the
courts considered, to varying degrees, the three factors the U.S. Supreme
Court has weighed in its legislative accommodation precedent.154 These
courts concluded that RLUIPA lifts a burden on religious exercise. 155
The Seventh Circuit noted that RLUIPA sought only to remove the most
substantial state-imposed burdens, while giving states' penological
interests due consideration. 56 Only the Fourth Circuit, in Madison,
considered whether RLUIPA burdens third parties. 57 Among the third
parties that RLUIPA possibly affects, the court considered only the
states, and concluded that the Act would not constitute a burden. 58 It
also found that the Act is not a burden because it applies only if the
states choose to accept federal correctional funds. 159
Lastly, each court considered whether it was permissible for RLUIPA
to relieve burdens on religious exercise without also relieving burdens
on secular constitutional rights.' 60 The courts agreed that RLUIPA could
benefit religious rights only,' 6' but only the Fourth Circuit, in Madison,
provided a detailed analysis of this point. 162 In particular, the Madison
court addressed the district court's theory that Congress must be neutral
toward religious entities and is not neutral when it lifts limitations on
150. 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003).
151. 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
152. 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
153. Madison, 355 F.3d at 313; Charles, 348 F.3d at 611; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069.
154. See Madison, 355 F.3d at 318, 320-21; Charles, 348 F.3d at 611; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at
1069.
155. See Madison, 355 F.3d at 318; Charles, 348 F.3d at 611 ; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069.
156. See Charles, 348 F.3d at 611.
157. See Madison, 355 F.3d at 320-21.
158. See id. at 321.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 318; Charles, 348 F.3d at 611; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1068-69.
161. See Madison, 355 F.3d at 318; Charles, 348 F.3d at 611; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1068-
69.
162. See Madison, 355 F.3d at 318-20.
1016
Vol. 79:999, 2004
Constitutionality of RLUIPA
religious rights while ignoring all others. 163 The district court supported
this rationale by reading Amos to turn on a congressional finding that
Title VII threatened religious exercise more than other rights.' 64 The
Fourth Circuit rejected this interpretation of Amos. 165 It concluded that
requiring Congress to examine if or how any other fundamental rights
were similarly burdened in order to protect burdened religious rights
would conflict with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 66 Instead, the
Fourth Circuit read Amos to hold that Congress may lift governmental
burdens on religious exercise without also relieving burdens on secular
constitutional rights. 1
67
B. The Sixth Circuit Has Held that RLUIPA 's Primary Effect Is To
Advance Religion
Breaking away from the other circuits, the Sixth Circuit, in Cutter v.
Wilkinson,168 held that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause. 169
The court considered three U.S. Supreme Court legislative
accommodation factors. 170 In determining that RLUIPA's primary effect
is to advance religion, the court first concluded that RLUIPA does not
lift a burden on religious exercise.' 71 It stated that the Turner rational-
relationship standard provided protection for religious exercise at the
time Congress enacted RLUIPA. 172 The Act, therefore, did not rectify a
163. Id.; see Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 577 n.9 (W.D. Va. 2003), rev'd, 355 F.3d
310 (4th Cir. 2003).
164. See Madison, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 577 n.9.
165. Madison, 355 F.3d at 318-19.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003). While the Sixth Circuit applied the Lemon test as its
framework for analysis, id. at 262, it also considered the principle of endorsement from Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1964) (O'Connor, J., concurring), in its primary effect inquiry. Cutter,
349 F.3d at 264. The Sixth Circuit focused on the primary effect prong and found that RLUIPA
conveyed a message of endorsement of religion. Id. It noted the U.S. Supreme Court had considered
several factors in making a determination of endorsement, id., but the Sixth Circuit found only two
factors to be the most relevant in its inquiry-first, whether the particular government action
benefited both secular and religious entities, and second, whether the action would induce religious
exercise, rather than only protect it. Id.
169. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 268-69.
170. Id. at 263-64, 266-67.
171. Id. at 267.
172. Id. at 263. See also supra Part I.C (describing the Turner rational-relationship test).
1017
Washington Law Review
congressionally-created burden. 7 3 Thus, an exclusively religious
exemption, such as § 702 of the CRA, which Congress passed to relieve
a burden Title VII placed on religious organizations, would not be
warranted. 174 The Cutter court also addressed RLUIPA's burden on third
parties.'75 The court concluded that the Act, which required enhanced
protection for the right to exercise religion relative to other constitutional
rights, 176 favored religious rights over secular rights and would induce
non-religious prisoners to adopt a religion in order to obtain a preferred
status in the prison community. 1
77
Finally, addressing RLUIPA's scope, the court concluded that the Act
was not analogous to Amos because it singled out religious rights for
protection. 78 Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Madison, the Sixth Circuit in
Cutter interpreted Amos to allow Congress to favor religious exercise
rights over secular rights only when religious exercise rights are at a
greater risk of deprivation. 179 The Cutter court noted that there was no
evidence that prisoners' religious exercise rights were threatened more
than their secular rights.180 Furthermore, the court reasoned that any
indication from Amos that Congress could benefit only religious exercise
rights could be explained. 18 It interpreted the exemption in Amos as
necessary to avoid entangling the government in church operations to
monitor their compliance with Title VII.182 It concluded that the Amos
accommodation was a narrowly tailored solution to the potential
entanglement problem. 83 Section 702 was necessary to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation, whereas RLUIPA applied to many
generally applicable prison regulations. 184 The court reasoned that
because the Free Exercise Clause did not require the enactment of
173. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 266-67.
176. Id. at 264-65.
177. Id. at 266-67.
178. Id. at 263-64. Although the court analyzed Amos under the secular purpose prong of Lemon,
Amos dealt with the scope factor in the primary effect prong. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-38 (1987).
179. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265.
180. Id. at 265-66.
181. Id. at 268.
182. Id. at 267.
183. Id. at 268.
184. Id.
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RLUIPA, and there was no evidence that religious rights were at a
greater risk of deprivation than other fundamental rights, RLUIPA
impermissibly provided heightened protection only for religious
prisoners.'
5
IV. AS A LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATION, RLUIPA DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
RLUIPA is a constitutional legislative accommodation under the
Establishment Clause because it does not have the impermissible effect
of advancing religion.186 U.S. Supreme Court precedent provides three
relevant factors for courts to consider in making this determination.1 87
Applying these factors to RLUIPA demonstrates that the Act does not
have the primary effect of advancing religion and is therefore
constitutional under the Establishment Clause. 88 First, RLUIPA lifts
"substantial" burdens on a prisoner's exercise of religion. 89 Second,
RLUIPA does not impermissibly burden third parties.1 90 Third, while
RLUIPA protects only prisoners' exercise of religion, the scope of the
accommodation is appropriate given its secular purpose. 91
A. RLUIPA Lifts Substantial Burdens on Prisoners'Exercise of
Religion
RLUIPA relieves "substantial" government-imposed burdens on
prisoners' religious exercise that do not further, by the least restrictive
means, a compelling government interest. 192 Thus, by its terms, RLUIPA
brings itself within the rule established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Gillette and Amos, as well as the plurality in Texas Monthly: legislative
accommodations may relieve only those "significant" burdens that
185. See id. at 265-66.
186. The secular purpose and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test as applied to RLUIPA are
beyond the scope of this Comment.
187. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11-17, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337, n.15, 338 (1987); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445, 452-53 (1981);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
188. See infra Part IV.A-C.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
190. See infra Part IV.B.
191. See infra Part IV.C.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a).
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threaten "severe encroachment on protected religious freedoms."'' 93
Prison regulations that prohibit or penalize inmates for following their
religious beliefs constitute a significant burden.' 94 Prison regulations
restricting religious exercise require prisoners to make the Hobson's
choice between acting in a manner offensive to their consciences and
suffering the consequences of non-compliance. 195 For example, Muslim
and Jewish prisoners are sometimes served pork or forced to go
hungry, 196 though one Muslim minister declared that even "if our lives
depend on it ... we can't eat pork."' 9 7 Thus, there is a significant burden
when prisoners must choose between obeying their religious consciences
and complying with prison regulations.
All four circuit courts that have considered RLUIPA's
constitutionality incorrectly applied the severity of burden factor.
Although the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits correctly recognized
that RLUIPA lifts a burden on prisoners' religious exercise, 198 the courts
failed to analyze the severity of burden required for a permissible
accommodation. 199 The courts' rulings would permit the accommodation
of any burden on religion.200 However, if that were the case, the sales tax
exemption in Texas Monthly would have been permissible.0 1
The Sixth Circuit incorrectly concluded that prisoners' religious
exercise is not burdened because Congress did not impose an
"affirmative" burden on religious exercise and enact RLUIPA as a
193. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion); Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445
(1971).
194. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 445.
195. See id.
196. See, e.g., Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 48 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding genuine issue as to
whether denial of a Muslim prisoner's request for removal of pork from his meal tray would meet
the rational-relationship standard); see also United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (upholding the prison's denial of a Jewish prisoner's request for kosher food when applying a
"reasonableness" standard), vacated on other grounds, 520 F.2d 598, 600 (2d Cir. 1975).
197. Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 812, 823 (1977)
(citing Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
198. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601,
611 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002).
199. See Madison, 355 F.3d at 317-19; Charles, 348 F.3d at 609-11; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at
1068-69.
200. See Madison, 355 F.3d at 317-19; Charles, 348 F.3d at 609-11; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at
1068-69.
201. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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solution to the burden.2 °2 In essence, the court distinguished a burden
impused by Congress itself, which may be lifted by a legislative
accommodation enacted by Congress, from the burden imposed by rules
or actions of any federal, state or local prison administration, which may
not be lifted by a legislative accommodation enacted by Congress.2 °3 Not
only has the U.S. Supreme Court not made this distinction,2°4 but such a
distinction does not make any substantive difference in the case of
RLUIPA. In Amos, the Court stated that the government may act to lift a
regulation that burdens religious exercise; 20 5 however, the Court did not
base its conclusion on the premise that Congress could only lift a burden
it had directly imposed on religion.20 6 Furthermore, the Act applies only
when the prison officials voluntarily accept federal funds or the burden
on religious exercise affects interstate commerce.20 7 Therefore, by
weighing the costs and benefits of adopting RLUIPA,2 °8 prison officials
may choose whether or not to adopt its requirements.20 9
Second, the Sixth Circuit concluded that, in the absence of evidence
that religious exercise had a "greater risk of deprivation," RLUIPA had
to protect "other fundamental rights" in order to be a permissible
accommodation. 210 The Sixth Circuit interpreted the severity of burden
factor to require that the burden be more egregious or the right more
likely to be deprived than other constitutional rights to warrant the
accommodation. 21  This stands contrary to Amos, which did not require
the simultaneous protection of other fundamental rights for the
accommodation to be permissible.21 2 The Sixth Circuit therefore was
202. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2003).
203. See id.
204. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I(b) (2000).
208. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 2003).
209. While RLUIPA may apply to a prison that does not receive federal funding through the
commerce provision in § 2000cc-l(b)(2), burdens on religious exercise or the removal of those
burdens are unlikely to "affect commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with
Indian tribes." While the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to be quite
expansive, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, § 3.3.4, in recent years the Court has limited the scope
of Congress's commerce power. Id. § 3.3.5. However, the Commerce Clause is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
210. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 265 (6th Cir. 2003).
211. Id.
212. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
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incorrect because it found no burden on religious exercise when the
burden is not directly imposed by Congress.2 13 Effectively, the Sixth
Circuit required that there be greater deprivation of religious exercise
relative to other fundamental rights before Congress could institute
greater protection for religious exercise.
214
B. RL UIPA Does Not Impermissibly Burden Third Parties
While RLUIPA may inconvenience states by requiring them to
comply with its conditions, this inconvenience does not qualify as a
"burden" under U.S. Supreme Court precedent.215 As the Amos Court
indicated, to qualify as a burden for Establishment Clause purposes, the
government itself must impose the limitation.1 6 In Amos, the Court
noted that Congress, through § 702 of the CRA, simply provided the
opportunity for religious organizations to discriminate in choosing their
employees; it was up to the organizations to burden their employees by
exercising their rights under § 702.217 On the other hand, in Caldor, the
state directly burdened employers by passing a law requiring that they
let their Sabbath-observing employees choose their day off.218 Under
RLUIPA, the federal government does not directly burden states because
RLUIPA only applies to the states if they accept federal funding for their
prisons or the substantial burdens on religion affect interstate
commerce. 219 States may refuse to adopt RLUIPA's conditions by
forgoing federal funds.22°
RLUIPA also does not burden non-religious prisoners because
RLUIPA does not lessen the protection afforded prisoners' constitutional
rights under the Turner rational-relationship standard.22 1 If RLUIPA
forced non-religious prisoners to give up their rights or to expend their
own resources to help accommodate religious prisoners' exercise of
religion, its constitutionality could be questioned.222  However,
213. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267-68.
214. See id.
215. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 337; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985).
216. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337.
217. See id. at 337 n.15.
218. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709.
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b) (2000); see also supra note 209.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b).
221. See id.
222. See, e.g., Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709-11 (finding unconstitutional a Sabbath statute that
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RLUIPA's text does not explicitly require or even hint at such a
possibility.2 23 Instead, the Act merely requires that regulations restricting
religious exercise undergo greater scrutiny than regulations restricting
other rights.224 Furthermore, the Act is not an absolute prohibition or
demand as in Caldor.225 It requires only that prisons impose the least
restrictive alternative,226 which would permit prison officials to take into
account the interests and rights of the non-religious prisoners.
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits did not consider RLUIPA's burden
on third parties, 227 and the Fourth Circuit did not consider RLUIPA's
burden on the prisoners who do not perform religious exercises. 228 The
Sixth Circuit contemplated the possibility that RLUIPA would burden
non-religious prisoners by causing them to resent their religious fellow
inmates.29 Although it is possible that non-religious prisoners may grow
to resent their neighbors' enhanced right to exercise their religion,23° the
U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed or considered resentment as a
burden in accommodation cases. For instance, in Gillette, the Court did
not raise the objection that people drafted to serve in the military might
resent those left at home because their religion renounced all war.3
Thus, while non-religious prisoners may resent the different treatment
religious exercise receives, such resentment does not constitute the
"unyielding weighting" of religious prisoners' interests prohibited by
Caldor.232
C. RL UIPA 's Scope Is Broad Enough, Given Its Secular Purpose
Although RLUIPA benefits only those prisoners who perform
imposes an absolute duty on employer's business practices to conform to the Sabbath the employee
unilaterally designates).
223. Id.
224. Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (applying the rational-relationship
standard), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (requiring a strict-scrutiny standard).
225. See Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709.
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(2).
227. See generally Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland,
314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
228. See generally Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003).
229. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d at 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2003).
230. See Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 581 (W.D. Va. 2003), rev'd on other grounds,
355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003).
231. See generally Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
232. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985).
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religious exercises, the Act's secular purpose of protecting religious
liberty justifies its less-inclusive scope.2' 3 Both the Gillette and Amos
Courts upheld laws exclusively benefiting religious entities because the
legislative intent to protect religious conscience and religious autonomy
made it sensible and intuitive to protect only religious individuals or
organizations. 3 On the other hand, the Walz Court recognized that
when the government intended merely to foster society's moral and
mental improvement, the legislative accommodation appropriately
235thcovered religious, charitable, and quasi-public entities. While the
Texas Monthly Court did not reach a majority consensus on how
inclusive or encompassing a tax exemption must be to be
constitutional,2 36 the plurality described its view as requiring the
accommodation to be as broad as its secular purpose would require,237
and also affirmed Amos. 238 While the plurality opinion is not binding
precedent, its view is the strictest view of permissible legislative
accommodations. 239 Thus, if a legislative accommodation can meet the
Texas Monthly plurality's strict standard, it would meet all other U.S.
Supreme Court standards.
RLUIPA's scope reaches all institutionalized persons exercising
religion.240 Also, it does not, and need not, protect the exercise of "all
other constitutional rights, 24 1 for the secular purpose of RLUIPA is "to
protect religious liberty. '242 It is broad enough to cover all religious
exercise, including all sects and minority religions. 243 Non-religious
individuals or entities thus would not need this protection, and including
233. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (finding no
reason to include secular entities in accommodation when purpose is to lift burden from religion).
234. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 338; Gillette, 401 U.S. at 452-53.
235. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
236. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 16 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 27-28
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 15-16 (plurality opinion).
238. Id. at 18 n.8 (plurality opinion).
239. The Court has not articulated a more restrictive view of legislative accommodations
provided exclusively for religious individuals or rights. See Shawn P. Bailey, The Establishment
Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 16 REGENT U. L.
REV. 53, 64 n.82 (2004).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I (2000). This assumes that the prison either receives federal funds or
the burden affects interstate commerce. See supra note 209.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I (2000).
242. 146 CONG. REc. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).
243. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1, cc-5(7)(A).
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them in the scope of this accommodation would not further this secular
purpose. For example, it would be entirely illogical for RLUIPA, a
federal statute that seeks to further the permissible secular purpose of
protecting religious liberty, to include in its scope the right of prisoners
to access pornography.244 Because the purpose of RLUIPA is secular and
entirely permissible,245 this purpose controls the scope of the
accommodation required to maintain constitutionality.
246
While the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits correctly noted that the
scope of a legislative accommodation may be limited exclusively to
247
religious entities, these courts did not consider the breadth of scope
required for the accommodation to be constitutional. The breadth
required would depend on the scope of its secular purpose. 48 In certain
circumstances, accommodation of exclusively religious entities would be
invalid if it was not broad enough to comport with its secular purpose.249
However, the Sixth Circuit held that RLUIPA is unconstitutional.25°
The Court concluded that, absent evidence that prisoners' religious
exercise rights are at "a greater risk of deprivation" than their other
secular rights, RLUIPA cannot provide greater protection of prisoners'
religious exercise rights than their other secular rights.25 ' This standard
is contrary to the holdings in Amos and Gillette, where the Court
affirmed Congress's ability to single out religious rights for enhanced
protection when doing so is necessary to relieve those rights from a
significant burden.252 Besides being contrary to U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, the Sixth Circuit's standard ignores that the appropriate
244. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 319 (4th Cir. 2003).
245. This Comment assumes that RLUIPA's purpose is not at issue. See also Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (concluding that lifting government-imposed
burdens on free exercise of religion is a proper government purpose).
246. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion); Amos, 483
U.S. at 338; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452, 454 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
247. Madison, 355 F.3d at 318; Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 2003);
Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002).
248. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15-16 (plurality opinion); Amos, 483 U.S. at 338; Gillette, 401
U.S. at 450-52; Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73.
249. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15-16 (plurality opinion) (noting that an exclusively
religious exemption would not be broad enough even when it had a valid purpose of promoting
reflection and discussion about questions of ultimate value).
250. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 265 (6th Cir. 2003).
251. Seeid.
252. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339; Gillette, 401 U.S. at 445.
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secular purpose of RLUIPA is "to protect religious liberty. 253
The Sixth Circuit ruling has wide-reaching implications. It calls into
question many legislative accommodations.5 Some examples include
the federal exemption from compulsory military service for ordained
ministers and divinity students,255 and some states' recognition of a
"clergy-penitent" privilege.256 Furthermore, this standard creates an
impossibly high standard that legislative accommodations must meet in
order to withstand constitutional attack.25 7 In the Sixth Circuit, any time
a legislature wishes to relieve an egregious burden on religious entities
or individuals, it must determine what other fundamental rights are at
risk and to what degree they are at risk.258 This requirement would lead
to "byzantine complexities" that would prevent government from
protecting fundamental rights above the minimum level set by the
Constitution.259
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court should hold that RLUIPA does not violate
the Establishment Clause because its primary effect is not to advance
religion. Although legislatures may accommodate religion beyond what
the Free Exercise Clause requires without violating the Establishment
Clause,26° the Court should explicitly apply the three factors discussed
above when analyzing whether the primary effect of a legislative
accommodation advances religion, and find RLUIPA constitutional.
This analysis will provide guidance to lower courts and aid legislatures
in discerning the limits of their discretion when attempting to
253. 146 CONG. REc. S7774-01 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).
254. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 320 (4th Cir. 2003) (listing several examples of
common legislative accommodations where constitutionality would be uncertain under the Sixth
Circuit's rationale).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id. After Smith, this would preclude any protection above the minimum required by the U.S.
Constitution. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990). Furthermore, the Smith
ruling suggests that, perhaps as compensation for diluting protection under the Free Exercise
Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court intended to affirm the legislature's latitude and discretion in
accommodating burdens on religion and, in effect, invited greater legislative protection. See id. at
872, 890.
260. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004); Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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accommodate religion. RLUIPA does not advance religion because it
lifts substantial burdens on prisoners' religious exercise, does not
impermissibly burden third parties, and has an appropriate scope in light
of its secular purpose to protect religious liberty.
1027
1028
